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ABSTRACT 
 
There have recently been significant and growing levels of government and regulatory 
interferenceiaffecting the cybersecurity risk and cyberrisk insurance practices in the UK 
financial sector. A short case study documents these efforts, based on the interviews 
conducted with relevant stakeholders, regulator representatives and other key gatekeepers as 
to most relevant areas and highlights efforts by the Bank of England to coordinate the 
industry’s resilience against cyber attacks. 
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1.Aims and Objectives- 
London is currently the world’s leading financial centre within the increasingly integrated, 
technologically sophisticated and growing global financial system. Moreover the UK 
financial services sector provides a significant contribution to the overall wealth of the UK, 
and is therefore a key element of the nation’s Critical National Infrastructure (CNI).1 
Moreover, responsible financial service entities operating in the UK have recent years 
become increasingly sensitive to and concerned about cybersecurity risk.2 It is therefore 
important to develop more integrated and timely monitoring systems that effectively 
communicate the associated information risk from the IT and operational risk areas to the 
board. However there are currently still no UK regulations that specifically address either the 
appropriate protocols for networks to mitigate against these threats, or to the reporting of 
such risks to the board, regulators and key stakeholders.3  There are also internal governance 
implications. Dutta et al. (2002) argue that cybersecurity risk management is a management 
issue, and not an IT issue. However these two issues have not been previously studied in a 
single paper. 
Most recently the UK government has joined forces with insurers on cybersecurity, as part of 
its efforts to manage cyber risk within the UK government Cyber Essentials Scheme (UK 
Government, 2013) and more generally to implement its Cyber Security Strategy (UK 
                                                            
1 Cybersecurity is the body of technologies, processes and practices designed to protect networks, systems, 
computers, programs and data from attack, damage or unauthorized access. CNI is defined as “certain ‘critical’ 
elements of infrastructure, the loss or compromise of which would have a major, detrimental impact on the 
availability or integrity of essential services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of 
life”.  
2 According to The Financial Times, cybersecurity attacks on companies has doubled in 2012-13 compared with 
the previous financial year (Financial Times, 21/10/13). The latest Lloyd’s (2013) risk index survey reveals that 
cybersecurity risk is now the third most important perceived risk faced by UK business, significantly higher than 
in 2011 when it was only ranked 12th. 
3 In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission requires registrants to disclose, as part of the management 
discussion and analysis part of their annual report filing (“10-K”) the risk of cyber incidents if these issues are 
among the most significant factors that make an investment in the company speculative or risky. However 
Ferraro (2013) argues that these SEC disclosure requirements are too vague and not sufficiently informative. 
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Government, 2011). However there is little or no literature evidencing the effectiveness of 
such coordination efforts to mitigate or prevent cyber attacks. The case study documents 
latest efforts by the UK regulators, firms and both professional and international bodies to 
coordinate with the insurance industry and key professional bodies to enhance  resilience 
against cyberattacks. 
 
 2. Institutional Background 
Key UK insurance firms trade-off the benefits of enhancing their business model through 
exploiting developments in cloud computing and big data, with the costs of investing in cyber 
risk management, and the strategies employed (e.g. via insurance, regulatory compliance and 
operational management). The case documents the dynamic and increasingly integrated 
threats from various sources: 
 Frictional risks from increased direct and hidden costs of complying with existing and 
developing EU and UK data protection laws (Grady and Parisi, 2006).  
 There are significant and material investment in cybersecurity resilience based audit 
and IT departments. Consultants regularly offer competitive and new digital security 
insurance and risk management solutions across the sector and best practices used by 
key insurance firms to identify fraud losses and potential theft of personal data held 
by organisations, related to both internal and external parties.  
 The rapid growth of information technology-based solutions has facilitated 
globalisation of services and transformed business models. 
 Current UK Protection laws and EU proposals for upgraded data protection laws and 
consider their likely impact on corporate responsibilities to comply with cybersecurity 
law, such as the international convention on cybercrime, human rights, national 
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security, as well as civil and criminal law related to money laundering, data collection 
and identify fraud.  
 
The report focuses primarily on recent issues related to cyber risks affecting key insurance 
firms, regulators and professional bodies to help better understand how these developments 
inter-relate with best practices in information risk governance, data and information 
management arising from recent technological advances. It also informs the business and 
academic community generally about the nature and outcomes of regulatory efforts to 
coordinate resilience of insurance firms against cyberrisk. 
UK insurance entities are particularly susceptible to cybersecurity attacks because the 
integrity of their business models involves inter-connected responsibilities for maintaining 
resilience of their systems to various gatekeepers (e.g. regulatory agencies), actors (e.g. other 
financial services entities), and stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, consumers) which create 
pressures to ensure best practices in information risk governance, data and information 
management. To achieve success in international markets, UK-based global service providers 
and professional attestation firms  face challenges of moving towards competing on being 
able to offer unique, high quality assurance and innovative integration solutions to their 
financial services clients. Newly evolving EU and US based regulations impose complex 
risk-based reporting and capital adequacy rules, which requires firms to increasingly rely on 
complex web-based financial models for integrated data assurance and cybersecurity risk 
management.  
A key challenge facing such firms is to demonstrate sufficient ethical  management, and 
ensure high quality data integrity capabilities in order to meet increasingly stringent and 
complex requirements imposed by regulators. This however also requires firms to face the 
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need to trade-off investment in high quality of regulatory compliance monitoring 
mechanisms, with providing high quality value added services and performance to their 
clients and investors, respectively. However, the financial services industry generally, and the 
insurance industry specifically, particularly in globally exposed markets such as the UK, 
faces unique challenges in a changing regulatory environment. Enhanced infrastructure 
protection is also a key concern for financial service firms and their stakeholders. New 
Solvency II regulations and the proposed overhaul of existing Basle II regulations (where 
relevant) require greater reliance on complex financial models that require integration with 
existing financial, regulatory and customer databases.  
3. Literature review 
There is relatively little empirical, conceptual or analytical academic research specifically on 
cyber risk and/or cyber insurance that is of relevance to this study. Shackleford (2011) argues 
that firms should adopt a proactive approach to safeguard their assets against attack in a 
competitive environment. Biener et al. (2015) provide evidence of the insurability of cyber 
risk in a European and US context and find that there are significant problems in the market 
due to adverse selection problems, resulting from highly inter-correlated losses, lack of data 
and severe information asymmetry. They also provide evidence that there is a distinct lack of 
cyber insurance coverage available in the European context, in contrast to the US, possibly 
due to the lack of public policy engagement and reluctance of firms to disclose breaches. 
The lack of literature bearing on this topic contrasts with the frequent and often contradictory 
financial press coverage of these issues. For example the Computer Weekly (2014a,b,c,e) 
contains frequently contradictory articles in the benefits and costs of cyber risk insurance, 
perhaps because the authors are seeking to publicise their own consultancy services in this 
area. The Financial Times provides regular articles on this topic, but mostly focuses on the 
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impact of cyber-attacks on the banking sector (e.g. Braithwaite and Kuchler, 2014, Bonner, 
2014, Arnold, 2014, FT Reporters, 2014; Solman, 2014).  
By contrast there are relatively few articles on the direct impact of cyber-attacks, or the 
incidence of cyber insurance (Gray, 2014a, b). More recently the Bank of England 
penetration testing or CBEST was launched in October 2014, with the intention of testing 
financial services firms’ systems resilience against “ethical hacking” by BofE staff, the 
existence of such practices were first documented in April 2014 (Fleming 2014). However 
there is no public announcement of such efforts apparently due to the confidentiality issues 
(Solman, 2014).  
This situation contrasts with that in the US, where the Securities and Exchange Commission 
has issued guidance on disclosure of security breaches by US corporations. This in turn has 
facilitated empirical studies on the effectiveness of such disclosure requirements (e.g. Dutta 
den McCroban, 2002; Wang et al., 2013; Ferraro, 2014).  
Despite the lack of evidence on coordination efforts, there are a number of studies sponsored 
by consultancies (e.g. the Ponemon Institute, 2013, 2014; Datamonitor Financial, 2013), 
insurance firms (e.g. Atlantic Council and Zurich, 2014; Marsh 2014) and professional 
organisations (e.g. AIRMIC, 2013; ICAEW, 2012 and Institute of Risk Management, 2014; 
World Economic Forum, 2013) on various issues pertaining to both cybersecurity risk 
management and cyber risk insurance. However none of these studies focus specifically on 
the insurance industry. Although there are regularly held conferences on this topic (e.g. 
Institute of Risk Management, Association of British Insurers) these have not resulted in 
contemporary publications that shed light in this area. 
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4. Key questions 
Key gatekeepers, such as regulators, auditors, IT and risk management professional advisers 
play major role in determining the property rights and information production costs 
associated with assuring data and information integrity (Klumpes, 2013). 
This is because dealing with cyber-attacks for both data and information management and 
broader reporting processes requires the close engagement and interaction of major actors in 
the UK financial services sector, their  internal and external stakeholders and key 
gatekeepers. These include key industry players, both in terms of cybersecurity risk 
management and providers of cyber risk insurance, as well as BofE which has recently 
conducted research on the potential impact of cyberattacks jointly with the cabinet office, 
HM Treasury and the Financial Conduct Authority. Other professional bodies consulted 
included AIRMIC Ltd, and the Institute of Risk Management, which has recently published a 
report on risk resilience and tolerance issues within the financial sector (IRM, 2014), aswell 
as the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, which has recently set up a working party on cyber 
risk management. 
The key question addressed in this case is to examine the impact of key gatekeepers in 
influencing latest regulatory developments and the effectiveness of recent efforts to 
coordinate the ability of the UK insurance industry (e.g. via the BofE’s CBEST initiative) to 
assure the resilience of their systems against cyber attacks in the light of recent innovations in 
cloud computing and big data and evolving regulatory and societal pressures to assure 
integrity of these resources?  
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5. Who are the Key Gatekeepers, Participants and Stakeholders? 
 
In this section, we briefly overview the major gatekeepers, industry participants and other 
stakeholders in the cybersecurity risk management of the UK insurance industry. This 
discussion is kept at a fairly brief level. 
5.1. Key Gatekeepers 
Bank of England and other Regulators of Cybersecurity in the UK 
Operational and Cybersecurity Risk Management is a fundamental concern to all financial 
organizations in a digital economy and is an important subset of enterprise risk management. 
The use of the internet has significantly increased the vulnerability of financial organisations 
to information theft, vandalism, and denial-of-service attacks, thereby bringing information 
security issues to the forefront of the agenda for business innovators and corporate risk 
management executives. At the same time, there has been increased demand by regulators, 
shareholders and rating agencies and customers for credible and more sophisticated 
techniques for capital management and financial guarantees to meet new and developing 
IFRS, FSA-based individual capital assessment and Solvency II requirements. This in turn 
led to an increased demand for and the associated use of sophisticated computer systems and 
scenario stress testing models in the banking, finance, insurance and investment industries.  
The UK Government (2011) has raised awareness about the importance of information risk 
and its link to corporate governance effectiveness.4 While issues of security, confidentiality, 
                                                            
4 Information risk is defined as the “guardianship and management of information in all its aspects (integrity, 
availability and confidentiality) that is crucial to public service delivery” (UK Government, 2008, 6). 
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integrity, availability, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability are the foundations of 
computer security generally (Gollman, 2011) there are specific issues for financial service 
providers, particularly related to the potential for loss or misuse of sensitive regulatory and 
consumer-related data.5 The UK Data Protection Act requires that “appropriate technical and 
organizational measures shall be taken against unauthorized or unlawful processing of 
personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data.”6 
Recently the issue of cybersecurity threats and its relevance to corporate governance 
effectiveness in managing information risk have received extensive coverage in the financial 
press. However an important issue is the trade-off between ensuring that ethical 
responsibilities to disclose cyber attacks and their financial consequences to stakeholders are 
met, and the potential loss of privacy and the information production costs associated with 
making effective disclosures in the public domain. However, there is also little research 
concerning the financial consequences of such trade-offs in cybersecurity risk management of 
insurance firms.7  
The UK government has already committed £650 million to the National Cyber Security 
Programme (NCSP) launched in 2010. However since then there have been increasing threat 
posed by state industrial espionage, and international e-crime committed for political or 
personal purposes (Home Affairs Committee, 2013). The Intelligence and Security 
Committee (2013) raised issues of potential ethical conflict between commercial imperative 
and national security as a result of increasing private ownership of telecommunications 
networks that are considered to be part of the UK’s critical national infrastructure.  
                                                            
5 Latest statistics suggest that data theft by employees is pervasive, especially for financial services firms 
(Computer Weekly, 2 September 2013). The Financial Conduct Authority (2013) has reported receiving reports 
that fraudsters are using the name or other details of a genuine firm.  
6 Schedule 1, Principle 7 of Data Protection Act (1998). However neither the Act nor the Information 
Commission Office charged with implementing the Act provide any specific guidance for financial services. 
7 The Australian government established the Computer Emergency Response Team which annually surveys the 
impact of cyber crime and security issues affecting businesses comprise Australia’s CNI. 
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However, although the quality of investment in cybersecurity risk management processes is 
essential to meet regulatory needs and enhance the robustness and integrity of financial 
services firms’ data and information exchange, its impact on key external stakeholders and 
gatekeepers has not been previously systematically studied.8 There is also a lack of 
information sharing and engagement about these issues among firms and key gatekeepers.9 
On 17 September 2014, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) issued an updated version of 
its UK Corporate Governance Code including the related document Guidance on Risk 
Management and Internal Control and Related Financial and Business Reporting. The 
revised Code will apply to accounting periods beginning on or after 1 October 2014. The new 
code requires firms to disclose their principal risks, their policies for mitigating risks and the 
monitoring mechanisms used by the board to ensure effectiveness and risk culture. However 
there is no specific application to insurance. 
 
The Bank of England’s Prudential Regulatory Authority, which was only fully effective in 
2013 under the Financial Services Act, specifically is responsible for the preducential 
regulation of insurers and other financial service firms. It works together with the Financial 
Conduct Authority to provide a twin peaks regulatory structure. However the 2013 latest 
annual report of the PRA makes no specific mention of cybersecurity risks nor of the cyber 
risk insurance activities of the UK insurance sector.  
Industry Players 
                                                            
8 In March 2013 six South Korean banks were affected by a North Korean cyber attack, disrupting financial 
services worldwide and costing £500million to clear up (Guardian, 16 October 2013). 
9 The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2013) recommends greater geopolitical engagement on cyber 
security attacks, but did not focus distinctly on the financial system. The BBA (2013) recommended greater 
regulatory coherence in financial services but did not refer to cybersecurity issues specifically. 
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The major insurance companies are both part of the UK’s critical infrastructure and major 
players in the cyber risk market. A recent Geneva Association conference held in London 
highlighted the importance given to cyber risk management and insurance issues by key 
players such as Zurich, Aviva as well as smaller insurance firms. Most of the issues covered 
concerned the lack of coordination between regulators and the industry in addressing 
concerted cyber-attacks, notwithstanding the recent UK government consultation with the 
industry. Because of the competitive nature of the market as well as the lack of uniform 
mandatory disclosure of cyber breaches in the UK and/or the EU (in contrast to the US) there 
is a distinct unwillingness to voluntarily disclose breaches. This situation contrasts with the 
UK banking industry, where large UK banks regularly report such breaches and whose efforts 
to mitigate them involve active coordination by the relevant industry body (The British 
Bankers’ Association). By contrast, neither the equivalent industry body for insurance (the 
Association of British Insurers) nor that of insurance brokers (The British Brokers 
Association) currently (to the best of the author’s knowledge) have any active programme of 
consultation with the industry on such issues. 
Professional Bodies 
As mentioned above, both AIRMIC Ltd and the Institute of Risk Management issued 
publications on cyber risk management and insurance. However they did not specifically 
address insurance issues. The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries presently do not have an 
active research programme of publications in this topic, although it is currently under 
development. 
Consultants and Advisers 
Consultancy and advisory organisations specialising in cyber risk management and/or 
insurance produce annual publications in these areas (e.g. Marsh, Ponemon Institute) 
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although these tend to be US, rather than UK or EU oriented. The Big 4 accountancy firms 
occasionally issue reportst to their clients on current developments although these lack 
specificity. It appears that a large number of consulting actuarial firms and other consulting 
firms have strong interest in the area although none were prepared to be interviewed and did 
not produce publicly available regular surveys, specifically in connection with the UK and/or 
EU insurance industries. 
6. Discussion  
A total of 10 interviews were conducted over a period of five days in London during October-
November 2014. Of these, 3 interviews involved BofE and/or PRA officials, 3 interviews 
involved industry players and/or insunce brokers, and the remainder were held with 
Professional bodies such as the IFOA and IRM representatives. The major results of these 
interviews are discussed below. For confidentiality reasons, the names and affilliations of 
those interviewed has been withheld. 
6.1 Bank of England and/or PRA 
The BofE has three major areas of interest in cybersecurity risk management and insurance 
issues within its remit. First, it has a responsibility to ensure systemic risk avoidance through 
the coordination of cyber attack mitigation in coordination with key players of the UK 
financial services industry. Second, it has a specific responsibility, through its insurance 
division located within the Prudential Regulatory Authority department, over the audit and 
quality monitoring of cybersecurity risk management systems of major players. Third, it has a 
responsibility to monitor and supervise insurers offering cyber risk insurance. The interviews 
addressed issues related to all three of these areas, the major result of which are briefly 
outlined below.  
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The CBEST initiative was specifically instigated by the BofE to assure the intrigity of 
standards of cyber risk management of the UK financial services industry, of which the 
insurance industry is a key component. It is also connected to the UK government’s policy on 
cyber risk as documented above. The Chief Information Security Officer of BofE had 
recently been interviewed on international and national efforts to coordinate defence of the 
banking industry to cyber attackes (Amar, 2014) but did not mention the insurance industry. 
He did not refer to any specific initiatives focusing solely on the insurance industry, however 
noted the recent consultation between the government and key industry players.  
Other officials from the PRA were interviewed as part of a broader industry roundtable that 
was hosted by a key insurance broker. Some officials were responsible for supervising the 
cyber risk insurance market, while others monitored activities by key players with significant 
cyber security risk exposure. It became apparent that regular coordination between various 
officials within the PRA was lacking and an outcome of the meeting was to improve this. 
However the officials did not respond to further requests for interview to clarify these 
comments subsequently. 
6.2. Industry key players 
The industry sector has a strong interest in ensuring adequate monitoring of the cyber risk 
management systems. Additionally there are issues relating to how cyber risk insurance 
should be “priced” for soon-to-be-implemented European wide Solvency II capital adequacy 
requirements. The representatives of the two major insurance companies interviewed claimed 
to have sophisticated and regular monitoring of such attacks, but declined to name instances 
of such attacks. They also admitted that the design and implementation some of the relevant 
protection software was outsourced to third party consultants.   
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A further issue concerned the pricing of cyber risk insurance. An interview was held with 
senior managers and underwriters of a major insurance broker in this market. It was 
aapparent that there is a lack of publicly available data on the instances and severity of recent 
cyber attacks on the UK insurancce industry. The lack of such generally available data 
reduced the efficiency of the market but also created more opportunity to operate in what was 
regarded as a fairly lucrative market. The absence of any recently publicly known severe 
cyber attacks on key industry players (in contrast to the banks) contributed further to the lack 
of actuarially fair pricing of insurance.  
Senior management representatives of both large and small insurance firms discussed the 
growing importance of these issues at a Geneva Association conference held in London in 
October 2014. However the author had only limited opportunities to follow up specific issues 
with the key speakers. It appears that cyber risk management is a key and major consideration 
for most of these firms. However by contrast the cyber risk insurance market is seen as being 
“high risk” and creates complications for both actuarial fair pricing and capital modelling 
purposes. There appeared to be a lack of consensus among speakers as to the growth potential 
of this market in the European context, although all agreed it was a significant and major 
issue for boards of companies. 
 
6.3. Professional bodies and Industry Associations 
Various industry bodies, including AIRMIC Ltd, IRM were interviewed but did not appear to 
have strong views on the topic beyond general concerns about the quality of risk management 
processes and documenting various descriptive issues concerning accessing cyber risk 
insurance policies. Both bodies have recently published guidance to members on these issues 
as noted above and plan to continue to do so in the near future as the cyber risk insurance 
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market develops. It was noted this was an area lacking regulatory oversight and guidance and 
that the professional bodies played an important role in education and in providing support to 
members. 
Despite a number of its members playing key roles as senior management and/or consultants 
to the insruance industry, the IFOA has not published any definitive position papers or 
guidance on this topic. The author is an honorary fellow of the IFOA and has made 
presentations on this topic to IFOA working parties and to IFOA-sponsored conferences 
during 2014. The IFOA is currently is in the process of setting up a working party on cyber 
risk management, of whch the author has been invited to participate. It is expected that this 
working party will produce a literature review on the topic and generate some ideas for 
discussion within the UK actuarial profession in the early part of 2015. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines how regulatory officials, major industry players, professional bodies and 
consultants to the industry interact to coordinate efforts to secure key IT infrastructure in the 
UK financial services sector, focusing on the insurance industry. The case study provides a 
number of conclusions. First, it is apparent that this is a very sensitive and commercially 
valuable area for many participants. This may explain the relatively poor response rate to 
requests for interview, particularly by consultants. Further, high-level coordination between 
the UK government in seeking to implement public poliy on national cyber security strategy 
and the industry is in very early stages. Further, relevant industry players appear reluctant to 
provide greater public transparency on cyber attacks, and appear to be hostile to efforts to 
sponsor publicly available databases on such incidents. The lack of engagement by key 
industry associations and other professional bodies on issues specific to the insurance 
industry also compound the issue. This situation is in contrast to that in the banking industry. 
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The consultants in particular seem wary of maintaining their competitive advantage in 
providing specialist services to the major players seeking to mitgate against cyber risk 
attacks.  
From a public policy perspective, there appears to be a growing awareness by key regulatory 
supervisors such as the BofE’s PRA to hold more regular and detailed monitoring and 
coordination with key industry players. Further specialist professional bodies such as the 
IRM generally and the IFOA specifically are still the process of developing major thought 
leadership on such issues.  
Further research is needed to identify and analyse the impact of coordination efforts on the 
pricing of cyber riskk insurance. Currently existing models of pricing do not appear to 
consider the impact of public interference or oversight on the activities of major players. 
Further there is a lack of shared knowledge at the public level concerning the nature, 
incidence and severity of cyber attacks, relative to the US, which may lead to inefficiencies in 
the pricing of cyber risk insurance. This might explain the lack of current depth of this market 
relative to the US, although most industry players appear to recognise that this is a growing 
and increasingly significant market. Further efforts to develop such a public database of such 
incidents, and/or public regulatory demands for increased transparency by firms of such 
attacks as is already the case in the US, may assist in facilitating more general awareness of 
the issues, and facilitate more informed and rigorous academic research into this increasingly 
important topic. 
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